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The increasing prevalence of white-collar crime should prompt South 
African courts and legislators to consider the efficacy of sentences for these 
offenders. This article will define white-collar crime, discussing its theoreti-
cal ambiguities. It will then focus on the current sentencing of white-collar 
offenders in South Africa. A sentencing study on white-collar crime in the 
United States reveals that courts take account of various factors concerning 
the nature of the act and the actor. South African courts justify their sentenc-
ing decisions on similar factors, but also emphasise deterrence. Deterrence 
should not be given undue weight as the constitutional principle of pro-
portionality must guide the courts. Imprisonment tends to be the preferred 
sentence for white-collar criminals, but there are constitutional, empirical 
and pragmatic issues with imprisonment, particularly the overcrowding of 
prisons. The courts should instead utilise community sentences for white-
collar criminals who are not violent and can contribute their professional 
skills to society. South Africa requires greater resources for the administering 
of community sentences, and possibly, new legislation, such as the United 
Kingdom’s Criminal Justice Act of 2003. Consideration of foreign legislation 
combined with increased resources would assist the effective implementa-
tion of community sentences for white-collar criminals in South Africa.
PART I: INTRODUCTION
A rapidly emerging issue in the criminal justice system is the manner in 
which to investigate, prosecute and sentence white-collar criminals. This 
article focuses on the sentencing of white-collar criminals. Despite its 
devastating economic impact, white-collar crime has received relatively 
little attention from academics and even less constructive comment 
from the courts in the realm of sentencing. Part of the dilemma arises 
from the complex nature of white-collar crime and its insidious pres-
ence in the ‘organisational culture’1 of business.
This article is divided into four parts which address various aspects 
of sentencing white collar crime. Part one of this article is intro -
ductory, whilst part two will define white-collar crime and introduce 
* BA LLB (UCT) Candidate Attorney, Bowman and Gilfillan Attorneys.
1 N Shover and A Hochstetler Choosing white-collar crime (2006) 161.
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the ambiguities surrounding the concept. It will also investigate the 
consequences of white-collar crime, which are of particular importance 
as they have a bearing on the sentencing approach of courts. Part 
three will assess the treatment of white-collar criminals by the courts. 
The courts in South Africa appear to weigh a number of factors in 
determining a suitable sentence for white-collar criminals. A critical 
flaw is the emphasis the courts place on the notion of deterrence. 
The danger of focusing on deterrence is the justification of exemplary 
sentences of imprisonment for white-collar criminals. Finally, part four 
of this article will argue that community penalties form a viable and 
appropriate punishment for less severe cases of white-collar crime. 
The courts appear to adopt a one-dimensional approach to sentencing 
white-collar criminals by choosing imprisonment to the exclusion of 
non-custodial sanctions. Prisons in South Africa are operating under 
great strain because of over-crowding. Imprisonment is demanding 
on resources, has minimal restorative and rehabilitative consequences 
for offenders and its effectiveness as a deterrent is uncertain. These 
difficulties with imprisonment suggest community sentences are pref-
erable for white-collar criminals. Not only are white-collar criminals 
positioned to make a productive contribution to society in terms of 
community orders, but they are also usually non-violent offenders who 
should not pose a risk to communities when re-integrated.
There are two obstacles to using community penalties for white-
collar criminals in the South African context and moving away from 
the reliance on imprisonment. First, community orders are seen as 
lenient punishment thus there is a reluctance to utilise them, second, 
the severity of this type of sentence is difficult to measure. Von Hirsch 
and Wasik have suggested that the courts gauge severity in terms of 
the impact of the order on the living standards of the offender. This 
is compatible with the constitutional requirement of proportionality 
and a workable manner in which to utilise the community penalty as a 
sentence. The practical implementation of this theoretical understand-
ing can be seen in the Criminal Justice Acts of 1991 and 2003 in the 
United Kingdom. They provide an example, which the South African 
criminal justice system can investigate and consider further guidelines 
and legislation to implement community sentences more effectively.
PART II: DEFINING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
Definitions
A workable conception of white-collar crime is a necessary starting 
point to set the parameters for this discussion, besides being important 
for the comparability of empirical investigations and theoretical dis-
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cussions.2 Although earlier sociologists had taken note of white-collar 
crime, Edwin Sutherland is attributed with conceptualising white-collar 
crime.3 He described it as ‘a crime committed by a person of respect-
ability and high social status in the course of his occupation’.4 One of 
his aims was to force criminologists and other criminal justice profes-
sionals to evaluate the assumptions made about class and criminality 
— namely that criminals come only from lower social classes.5
Following its recognition as a category of crime, the definition of 
white-collar crime has been an area of difficulty and debate. The 
founding definition of Sutherland has been challenged on a number 
of grounds. The central criticism of his definition is that it emphasises 
class bias ‘at the expense of the offences themselves’.6 Other criticisms 
of the definition include the ambiguity surrounding the terms ‘respect-
ability’ and ‘high social status’ as well as the fact that it arbitrarily 
excludes certain white-collar crimes.7 Subsequently, the emphasis in 
the definition of white-collar crime has, according to most criminolo-
gists, shifted away from the distinguishing factors of class, status and 
respectability.8
The ensuing search for an appropriate conceptualisation of white-
collar crime has yielded varied responses. One reaction has been to 
question the necessity of providing ‘precise parameters’ at all when 
the concept of white-collar crime, by its nature, retains a ‘certain fuzzi-
ness’.9 Certainly the ‘fuzziness’ of white-collar crime is the cause 
of much debate. Besides the definition, the ambiguities surrounding 
white-collar crime feature in two other important areas, namely: the 
causes of white-collar crime; and, its regulation and sentencing.10 Of 
2 D Nelken ‘White-Collar Crime’ in Maguire et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Crimi-
nology (2002) 844 at 847.
3 G Geis ‘White collar crime: What is it?’ (1991-2) 3 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 
9 at 11. See M Benson and F Cullen ‘White-collar crime: Holding a mirror to the core’ 
(1993) 4 Journal of Criminal Justice Education 325 for a historical perspective on 
white-collar crime over the past seventy years.
4 E Sutherland White-collar Crime: The Uncut Version (1983) 7. 
5 M Dixon ‘The re-defining of white-collar crime’ (1994-5) 13 Dickinson Journal of 
International Law 561 at 562.
6 H Croall White-Collar Crime: Criminal Justice and Criminology (1992) 9. See for 
example J Braithwaite ‘White-collar crime’ (1985) 11 Annual Review of Sociology 1.
7 R Posner ‘Optimal sentences for white-collar criminals’ (1980) 17 American Criminal 
Law Review 409.
8 Croall op cit (n6) 9; Dixon op cit (n5) 565; S Green ‘The concept of white-collar crime 
in law and legal theory’ (2004-5) 8 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 1 at 8.
9 Geis op cit (n3) 10. T Hirschi and M Gottfredson argue that white-collar crime should 
not be a distinct category at all as there is little difference between it and street crime. 
Rather it complicates the understanding of the causes of criminality in general. See 
‘Causes of white-collar crime’ 25 Criminology 949.
10 Nelken op cit (n2) 847.
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these various ambiguities, only the definition and the regulation of 
white-collar crime are relevant to this discussion.
The most common escape from the criticism of Sutherland’s defini-
tion is to focus on the nature of the crime rather than class connotations 
as defining white-collar crime — that is, it is committed in the course of 
the occupation of the offender and is usually of economic significance. 
According to an accurate and simple definition by Croall, white-collar 
crime ‘is crime committed in the course of legitimate employment and 
involves the abuse of an occupational role’.11
The strength of this definition is that it emphasises the importance of 
the circumstances in which white-collar crime occurs — the offender is 
in a specific working environment and usually in a position of trust.12 
Another characteristic flowing from this definition is the low visibility 
of white-collar crimes because they are committed in a private occupa-
tional scene at which the offender is often legitimately present. Such 
crimes are typically complex because they involve a level of expertise. 
They are consequently difficult to detect and prosecute and require 
a reactive, as opposed to a preventative, response in terms of policy 
and legislation.13 Thus, the definition of Croall, focusing on the nature 
of the crime, is more useful for the purposes of this article and more 
practical in light of the flawed theory of Sutherland.14
Organisational crime versus corporate crime
Blankenship and Geis have suggested a partitioning of the ‘domain’ 
of white-collar crime into ‘major types’.15 For the purposes of this 
discussion on sentencing, a useful distinction can be made between 
organisational crime and corporate crime. The former focuses on of-
fences committed by individuals in their occupation or against their 
employers, within organisations, while the latter constitutes ‘illegal 
criminal behaviour which is a form of collective rule-breaking in order 
to achieve organisational goals’.16 The nature of juristic persons as 
white-collar offenders yields different options for punishment and sen-
tencing in comparison to those available for natural persons engaged 
in such crimes. Questions of imprisonment and community service 
11 Croall op cit (n6) 9.
12 The emphasis on the element of abuse of trust by white-collar offenders is often 
attributed to the work of S Shapiro in ‘Collaring the white-collar crime, not the crimi-
nal: reconsidering the concept of white-collar crime’ (1990) 55 American Sociological 
Review 346 in D Nelken (ed) White-Collar Crime (1994) 13.
13 Croall op cit (n6) 12.
14 Nelken op cit (n2) 855. 
15 Braithwaite op cit (n6) 19.
16 Croall op cit (n6) 11.
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usually arise only with regard to human individuals. Consequently, the 
focus of this discussion will be organisational crimes.
In practice, cases of white-collar crime frequently involve both in-
stances of corporate crime and organisational crime, exacerbated by 
the difficulty in separating the criminal activities of the individual in 
a corporation from those of the corporation as an artificial entity. The 
recent plea bargain entered into by the State with Graham Maddock, 
the financial director of Fidentia, and his chartered accounting firm, 
Maddock Incorporated, is indicative of the close relationship between 
juristic entities and the people working for them.17
Two other ambiguous elements of the definition require explana-
tion. First, the label of white-collar crime has been used for a wide 
range of crimes. Some criminologists include as white-collar crime, 
contraventions of environmental regulations regarding pollution levels 
by industries and crimes against the consumer.18 While the serious-
ness of these crimes should not be underestimated, this article does 
not purport to deal with many of these assorted white-collar crimes. 
Rather, the focus is on white-collar crimes of fraud and theft in the 
occupational setting.19
Second, even within the category of fraud as white-collar crime, there 
is much variance in the seriousness of the offence.20 For instance, fraud 
can happen on a limited scale involving one victim and only a small 
amount of money or a vast number of people can be defrauded of mil-
lions, as in the case of the Fidentia matter. The variance in seriousness 
has implications for a discussion on the consequences of white-collar 
crime.
Consequences of white-collar crime
In the sentencing process, the court considers a number of conse-
quences resulting from the crime. The consequences of white-collar 
crimes are generally laid out as financial, physical and social. White-
collar crime is conventionally assumed to result in economic loss of 
17 Maddock Incorporated received R60 million in fines, suspended for five years, while 
Maddock received a seven-year imprisonment sentence. See IOL ‘Jailtime for Fiden-
tia’s finances man’, 4 February 2008, available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_
id=1&click_id=3045&art_id=nw20080201164501807C415090, accessed on 4 April 
2008.
18 S Box Power, Crime and Mystification (1998) 27.
19 Croall op cit (n6) 28 notes that not all fraud is committed in the course of the offend-
er’s occupation and therefore should not be properly considered white-collar crime. 
Hence, there is the need to identify the specific cases of fraud with which this discus-
sion is concerned.
20 The notion of severity will be considered below in Part IV of this paper.
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varying proportions.21 This is not to say that the crime does not have 
other measures of significance, but it usually involves this economic 
element, as opposed to violence or force.22 According to Schlegel and 
Weisburd, ‘violence is not prevalent enough in white-collar offending 
to be seen as a general indicator of crime seriousness’23 so there is a 
need for other indicators of seriousness.
A significant social issue identified in recent studies is the manner in 
which white-collar crimes are responsible for undermining the foun-
dational trust on which society is based.24 Shapiro gives substance 
to the notion of trust in white-collar crime by referring to the fiduci-
ary relationship in which there is an absence of direct control by the 
beneficiary and therefore potential for abuse.25 In S v Gardener,26 Uijs 
AJ elucidated this idea when he commented that ‘business, economic 
enterprise, economic intercourse is based on trust’. Geis mentions a 
similar concern when he comments that white collar crimes are more 
serious than offences committed by ‘the run-of-the-mill traditional 
kinds of offenders’ because they are ‘more threatening to the integrity 
of society’.27
Many discussions of white-collar crime draw attention to the informal 
sanctions of social and public embarrassment imposed on white-collar 
offenders by the prosecutorial process, such as the loss of their jobs, 
loss of reputation and, possibly, the loss of their friends’ and families’ 
support. Szockyj mentions that ‘because of their position in society,’28 
white-collar criminals may suffer more social stigmatisation and exclu-
sion than conventional criminals. In the case of S v Blank,29 the court 
acknowledged the social costs to the offender, as being the loss of his 
job, the fact that he could never practise again in his chosen profession 
and the immense social embarrassment that he had suffered from the 
widespread publicity around the case.
21 Conklin (1977) mentioned in Box op cit (n18) 20.
22 Box op cit (n18) 20, claims that there is and can be violence in white-collar crimes 
and this destructive potential is underestimated in convictions of offenders and gen-
eral public perception.
23 K Schlegel and D Weisburd ‘Returning to the mainstream: Reflections on past and 
future white-collar crime study’ in Schlegel and Weisburd (eds) White-Collar Crime 
Reconsidered (1992) 352 at 359.
24 Nelken op cit (n2) 846.
25 Shapiro op cit (n12) 348.
26 S v Gardener (C) case no SS32/06 23 April 2007, unreported at para 83.
27 G Geis and M Blankenship ‘Is incarceration an appropriate sanction for non-violent 
white-collar offenders?’ in C Fields and S Egger Controversial Issues in Corrections 
(1999) 155 in E Szockyj ‘Imprisoning white-collar criminals?’ (1998-9) 23 Southern 
Illinois University Law Journal 485 at 501.
28 Szockyj op cit (n27) 500.
29 S v Blank 1995 (1) SACR 62 (A) at 69C.
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Another controversial area regarding the effects of white-collar 
crime is the absence or presence of victims. In the past, there existed 
a perception that there are no victims in the conventional sense of 
white-collar crime.30 This was most likely a result of the difficulty in 
assessing the exact parties affected by the crimes. It may also have 
been influenced by the fact that white-collar crime is defined according 
to the particular circumstantial area of the workplace, not in relation 
to their victims.
However, there is increasing recognition of a host of actors who 
can be considered as victims. First, there are other corporations and 
organisations affected by white-collar crimes, such as in the case of 
price-fixing and bribery. Second, there are human victims such as tax-
payers, shareholders and even the poor — a point highlighted in the 
media coverage of the Fidentia matter in which widows and orphans 
were affected by the alleged criminal misconduct of the directors.31
It would appear that wherever the emphasis on the various conse-
quences of white-collar crime is placed, will influence the seriousness 
with which the crimes are viewed. Whereas Geis considers white-collar 
crimes more serious than street crimes because of his view on the 
breakdown of trust, Blankenship is of the opinion that violence should 
be the indicator of seriousness for both street crimes and white-collar 
crimes — the consequence being that the most serious punishment of 
imprisonment is not appropriate for white-collar criminals.32 Gener-
alisations as to the seriousness of white-collar crime compared with 
that of street crime are seldom capable of being sustained in light of 
the variety of consequences of both types of crime. The debate of Geis 
and Blankenship relates more to the treatment of white-collar crime in 
comparison with street crime, but the discussion places emphasis on 
whether the courts focus on the correct consequences of white-collar 
crime and whether they ought to be weighing such consequences in a 
certain manner.
While the court should not rank the effects of white-collar crime 
in a rigid manner, relying rather on the circumstances of the case, 
certain results deserve attention from the courts. Violence remains an 
uncommon occurrence in the cases of fraud and theft dealt with in this 
article, so it is not an appropriate or helpful consequence on which 
to concentrate in sentencing such white-collar crimes. It seems clear 
that abuse of trust should be viewed as important in the context of oc-
cupational crimes because of the employee-employer relationship and 
30 Box op cit (n18) 17.
31 Box op cit (n18) 21-2. See Y Kemp ‘Financial Services Firm in Fidentia probe’ Busi-
ness Report , 7 February 2007, available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectio
nId=&fArticleId=3669027, accessed on 16 September 2008.
32 G Geis and M Blankenship in Szockyj op cit (n27).
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the basis of trust underlying commercial interactions. In addition, the 
courts ought to take greater consideration of the presence of victims 
and the effects of white-collar crime on them. These factors will assist 
courts in assessing the appropriate sentence to fit the crime.
PART III: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SENTENCING 
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS
The aim of this section is to investigate the standards of, and justifica-
tions for, the punishment of white-collar criminals observed in South 
African courts. Despite the wide variety of crimes labelled ‘white-collar’, 
the focus will be on cases of fraud and theft. In recent cases, the courts 
have considered a variety of factors when deciding upon an appro-
priate sentence for white-collar criminals and the factors considered 
have affected the sentencing decision and ultimate choice of sentence. 
While it is hard to identify each and every reason in a sentencing judg-
ment, there have been various studies on the sentencing of white-collar 
criminals in the United States of America, which suggest an emphasis 
on certain factors. These factors will be related to the South African 
context so as to provide a framework to critically consider some of the 
most important fraud and theft cases of the constitutional era.
Lack of data
By way of preliminary remarks, one should note that a major obstacle 
to the analysis of the treatment of white-collar crime is the lack of 
empirical research. Benson argues that it is because of the lack of data 
that white-collar crime has had a ‘small impact’33 on criminological 
studies. The lack of data is not necessarily evidence of an absence 
of interest, but rather because of the scarcity of prosecutions. Croall 
criticises criminologists who tend to focus on the few examples of the 
prosecution of high-profile offenders and draw conclusions from these 
studies.34 She suggests that this reliance on a limited sample leads to 
atypical results in studies of white-collar crime.35
Despite the increase in white-collar crimes, as noted by the trial 
court in S v Blank, there have not been many reported cases prosecut-
ing white-collar crime.36 Consequently, the discussion of high-profile 
cases is to be taken rather as a synopsis of the reported punishment of 
33 M Benson ‘Book review essay: Criminology and white-collar crime’ (1994) 19 Crimi-
nal Justice Review 100.
34 Croall op cit (n6) 17.
35 Ibid.
36 Squires J in the court a quo quoted by Grosskopff JA in S v Blank supra (n29) at 
73A.
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white-collar criminals and not a study from which one can draw broad 
generalisations regarding white-collar crime in South Africa.
Sentencing factors
One of the few studies on the sentencing of white-collar criminals 
has been that of Stanton Wheeler and his colleagues in the United 
States of America in the 1980’s. The study used four different types of 
variables to uncover the influences on judges regarding appropriate 
sentences for white-collar criminals: act-related, actor-related, legal 
process and other variables.37 Whereas the variables relating to legal 
process and those falling into the category of ‘other’ received only 
occasional mention in judgments, variables related to the nature of the 
criminal act and the actor were considered to be very influential on the 
judgments of the judicial officers in the study and therefore, of greater 
significance.38
Regarding the nature of the criminal act, the judges would look 
predominantly at the ‘dollar loss’39 from the offence, the amount of 
complexity involved in the offence, the size of the area across which 
the criminal activity spread, the nature and number of victims and the 
maximum period of imprisonment for which legislation allows.40 With 
regard to the actor, factors such as the previous criminal record, the 
‘impeccability’41 of the accused in terms of his prior reputation and 
contributions to society, his present socio-economic status and the role 
of the accused in the offence were considered. Generally the higher 
the position of trust the accused had occupied prior to prosecution, the 
greater the blameworthiness the accused was considered to have by 
the court.42 Two other variables related to the actor were mentioned by 
judges in the study, both concerning the accused after the commission 
of the crime — the cooperation of the accused with the investigators 
and the presence or absence of remorse for the offence.43
In particular, the juxtaposition of impeccable records being a factor 
in favour of a lighter sentence and the violation of trust putting the 
accused in a less favourable light is known as the ‘paradox of leniency 
37 S Wheeler, D Weisburd and N Bode ‘Sentencing the white-collar offender: Rhetoric 
and reality’ (1982) 47 American Sociological Review 641 at 644.
38 Wheeler et al op cit (n37) 646.
39 Wheeler et al op cit (n37) 644.
40 Ibid.
41 Wheeler et al op cit (n37) 646.
42 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in S v Shaik 2007 (1) SA 240 (SCA), referred to the trial 
judge’s statement that this axiomatic relationship is a reason for increased blamewor-
thiness of the offender and seriousness of the offence at para 51.
43 Wheeler et al op cit (n37) 646.
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and severity’.44 This ‘paradox of leniency and severity’ does not usually 
arise in the context of ordinary street crimes and is therefore an impor-
tant distinction in the nature of the sentencing process for white-collar 
criminals. According to Wheeler et al, it also challenges the perception 
that wealthier white-collar criminals are less likely to receive a lengthy 
sentence of imprisonment.45 Evidence of these factors can be found 
when one turns to an analysis of South African cases.
Use of sentencing factors in South African cases
The South African courts appear to have utilised similar factors in 
justifying the punishment of white-collar criminals over recent years, 
consistency being a much-desired feature of a criminal justice system. 
The ‘paradox of leniency and severity’ has created a tension in the 
reasoned judgments of courts deciding upon the appropriate sentences 
for white-collar criminals in cases such as Gardener, Assante and 
Blank.46 On the one hand, the courts considered actor-related factors. 
The offenders were intelligent and competent employees. The court in 
Assante acknowledged the ‘good progress’47 of the accused at his place 
of employment, a banking institution, while the success of Blank in his 
career as a stockbroker was ‘meteoric’.48 All of these accused were, in 
addition, first-time offenders. On the other hand, there were numerous 
factors related to the nature of the act, which led the courts to impose 
serious sentences.
As one of the initial cases involving significant white-collar crime 
in the constitutional era, S v Blank has been influential in subsequent 
cases.49 A young, successful stockbroker was convicted of 43 counts of 
fraud amounting to a total of R9,75 million. He was sentenced in the 
court a quo to eight years’ imprisonment and his appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (against what he considered an exemplary sentence 
in its severity) was unsuccessful. The appeal court, upon considering 
the decision of the court a quo, considered it to have given thorough 
reasoning for the sentence. Notably, the court a quo had employed 
many of the factors Wheeler and his colleagues identified in use in the 
United States of America.50 The court a quo emphasised the position 
of trust in which the accused was placed as a stockbroker towards his 
44 Wheeler et al op cit (n37) 645.
45 Wheeler et al op cit (n37) 658.
46 S v Gardener [2007] JOL 92700 (C) is the judgment with S v Gardener (n26) as the 
sentencing judgment; S v Assante 2003 (2) SACR 117 (SCA); S v Blank supra (n29).
47 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120I.
48 S v Blank supra (n29) at 68G.
49 Ibid.
50 S v Blank supra (n29) at 77E.
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own firm, the client of his firm (Old Mutual) and the Stock Exchange, 
the length of time over which the trust was repeatedly betrayed by the 
offender, and the magnitude of the fraudulent scheme.51
In the two more recent reported cases of white-collar crime, the courts 
again emphasised the element of abuse of trust. In S v Gardener,52 two 
directors of LeisureNet Ltd were sentenced to eight and seven years’ 
imprisonment respectively. They failed to disclose an interest amount-
ing to six million rand each, which they had gained from a transaction 
entered into by LeisureNet with an overseas company. Over a period 
of four years, they were given at least three opportunities at various 
LeisureNet board meetings but failed to take steps to indicate their 
interest to the board.53
The accused in S v Assante54 was employed in the position of branch 
manager for NBS Bank and engaged in a dishonest scheme to obtain 
money in the amount of R345 million from investors, of which the 
resultant loss for investors was R128 million. Conradie JA expressed 
extreme concern at the ‘immense abuse of trust’ by the accused and 
his criminal behaviour whose effects the court felt were sufficient to 
‘destabilise the banking industry’.55 He acknowledged that although 
the sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment was severe, a sentence of 15 
years would have been justified by each of the counts of fraud totalling 
one million rand or more.56 There are a number of other cases in which 
abuse of trust has largely influenced the decision of the court.57
The issue of economic loss or ‘dollar loss’ has been canvassed by 
the courts. In S v Assante, the accused received an effective sentence 
of 24 years’ imprisonment for 108 counts of fraud in a scheme of 
‘breath-taking enormity’.58 The court specifically referred to the fact 
that although ‘counsel were unable to find a case where a period of 
imprisonment as long as this had been imposed for fraud,’59 there had 
not been a case in which the amounts fraudulently obtained were as 
large. Earlier in the judgment, he reiterated that the scale of the fraud 
was a ‘seriously aggravating’60 factor. In other words, the South African 
courts, like those analysed in the United States of America, appear to 
51 S v Blank supra (n29) at 72A.
52 S v Gardener supra (n46).
53 S v Gardener supra (n46) at para 121-4.
54 S v Assante supra (n46).
55 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120B.
56 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120F. S Terblanche ‘Sentencing’ (2004) 17 South African 
Law Journal 268 at 277.
57 See S v Shaik supra (n42) at 73A; S v Moolman 2006 (1) SACR 432 (T) at 441C-D.
58 Conradie JA referring to Joffe J in the court a quo supra (n46) at 119I.
59 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120I-J.
60 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120B.
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conceive of the severity of white-collar crime largely in relation to the 
economic loss caused by the criminal offence.
One reason for the court to rely on the economic loss is because in 
‘crimes of dishonesty, particularly fraud, it is often very difficult for the 
State to pin down precisely what prejudice was suffered by the victim 
or victims’.61 Indeed, the presence or absence of victims does not 
appear to have been such an influential factor in the cases considered 
thus far. The courts have seldom referred to the identity of the victims 
as being significant, perhaps because of the difficulty of identifying 
them and the prejudice caused to them by the white-collar crime. Often 
the prejudice suffered by victims is not quantifiable, especially the ‘loss 
of good name and the like’.62
The victims of white-collar crime are usually the employers or em-
ployees of the white-collar criminals. They can also be artificial entities 
such as corporations, like LeisureNet Ltd or Enron Corporation, whose 
shareholders indirectly suffered loss and whose employees endured 
the consequences of the loss of employment as well as financial loss.63 
Hittner J commented, in the first of a long line of cases concerning the 
Enron Corporation, that the fraudulent activities of various white collar 
criminals resulting in the bankruptcy of Enron had affected a ‘wide 
range of victims’ including the employees who had lost their jobs, 
creditors owed money by the entity and those who had owned stock, 
which ultimately had a ‘devastating impact’64 on the entire commu-
nity. This description of the Enron fraud conveys the manner in which 
loss caused by white-collar crime is dissipated across a large number 
of people, often with middle and lower income victims bearing the 
burden of loss in greater proportions.65
Shover argues that the analysis of white-collar crime usually concen-
trates on the costly economic loss as opposed to the victims. As a result, 
he claims the analysis underemphasises other effects and separates it 
from ‘the harm and seriousness of the problem’66 of criminal behav-
iour. Whereas victims of street crime are given support and attention 
at the very least, victims of white-collar crime experience little of the 
same.67 However, in the impending case of J Arthur Brown, the former 
Fidentia director, should the court find him guilty it may well note in 
61 S v Gardener supra (n26) at para 41.
62 Ibid.
63 See the facts of S v Gardener supra (n46) and US v Fastow 292 FSupp2d 914, 92 
AFTR2d 2003-7129, the first of many Enron cases.
64 US v Fastow supra (n63) at 916. 
65 Shover et al op cit (n1) 151.
66 Shover et al op cit (n1) 159.
67 Shover et al op cit (n1) 160.
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its final sentencing decision, the nature and number of the victims, 
including a large number of widows and orphans.
The final two factors related to the actor, and addressed by Wheeler 
et al, are the cooperation of the accused with the prosecution and 
evidence of remorse. While the former does not appear to play a 
significant role, the courts are concerned with the latter — remorse. 
The courts generally regard a guilty plea to be a prima facie sign of 
remorse.68 The repayment of any money gained fraudulently or stolen 
by the accused has been considered to be evidence of remorse as 
well.69 In Gardener, the ‘best thing [the accused] did’70 was to repay 
their profits and include an additional four million rand. However, 
Uijs AJ accepted repayment as a sign of remorse somewhat reluctantly 
because he felt there was a clear ‘measure of coercion’ involved which 
‘caused [the accused] to pay back’.71 Therefore it would seem that a 
genuine, voluntary repayment is valued more highly by the courts. In 
addition, if the accused has not made restitution by time of the trial 
despite promising to do so, as in S v Saeed,72 the court will not be able 
to take the promise into account as a mitigating factor.
The courts also consider whether the money was used for personal 
gain.73 In the case of S v Assante, the appellant still received a severe 
sentence in spite of Conradie JA noting that the money had ‘not directly 
benefited’74 him. This can be contrasted with S v Gardener where Uijs 
AJ emphasised that both of the accused were wealthy independent of 
the six million rand they each received directly from their fraudulent 
activities, pointing to their greed in committing the fraud.75
Emphasis on deterrence
Besides the use of the factors indicated in the Wheeler study, a promi-
nent local trend is the use of deterrence as a sentencing rationale in 
the treatment of offenders. In Blank, one of the central matters on 
appeal by counsel for the accused was the court a quo’s use of an 
exemplary sentence, justified on the ground of the increase in white-
collar crime.76 The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the argument that 
it was an exemplary sentence, claiming it simply had ‘strong deterrent 
68 See S v Assante supra (n46) at 120I; S v Blank supra (n29) at 69F.
69 S v Erasmus 1998 (2) SACR 466 (SE) at 470B-C.
70 S v Gardener supra (n26) at para 77.
71 S v Gardener supra (n26) at para 53.
72 S v Saeed [2006] JOL 17059 (SCA) at para 8.
73 S v Moolman supra (n57) at 441E.
74 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120I.
75 S v Gardener supra (n26) at para 93.
76 S v Blank supra (n29) at 73A.
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effect’.77 The court felt that the chosen sentence was justified in light 
of the evidence that illegal behaviour may be increasingly tolerated on 
the stock exchange.78
In the High Court case of S v Howells,79 Van Heerden AJ did not 
consider the magistrate to have attached undue weight, on a need for 
deterrence and the increase in fraud and theft by persons in fiduciary 
positions. In S v Gardener, Uijs AJ in the sentencing judgment, deemed 
it ‘indubitably…in the interests of society that people be told by way of 
sentences…that crime does not pay’.80 He enquired with a measure of 
self-consciousness about ‘[the] message’ that he would ‘send out to the 
public’81 under the label of the interests of community. By this, he was 
implying a need to use the sentencing of those two directors, Gardener 
and Mitchell, as a general deterrent to potential white-collar criminals. 
Upon evaluating the appeal of the accused against his sentence in S 
v Assante, Conradie JA likened the ‘alarming increase in white-collar 
crime’82 to a ‘scourge’.83 Like the other judges drawing attention to the 
frequent occurrence of white-collar crime, he was accurate and correct 
in his concern. However, deterrence is but one of many factors and 
rationales to be weighed in the sentencing process and should not be 
too heavily emphasised.
The frequent reference to deterrence by South African judges in 
cases of white-collar crime can be contrasted with increasing criticism 
of it as a sentencing aim in the past twenty years. According to many 
theorists, the use of deterrence has lost its attraction for a number of 
reasons including the lack of evidence regarding its effectiveness, its 
use of the accused as a means to an end and the assumptions underly-
ing it regarding the rationality of offenders.84
In particular, deterrence as a rationale can be criticised for justifying 
and, in certain circumstances, encouraging the use of exemplary sen-
tences. The justification for exemplary sentences given by deterrence 
theorists is the ‘aggressively’ forward-looking aim of discouraging po-
tential offenders from committing a similar crime as well as deterring 
the offender from recidivism.85 In this way, exemplary sentences can 
77 S v Blank supra (n29) at 79C.
78 S v Blank supra (n29) at 72I.
79 S v Howells 1999 (1) SACR 675 (C) at 681D.
80 S v Gardener supra (n26) at para 84.
81 S v Gardener supra (n26) at para 85.
82 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120B.
83 S v Assante supra (n46) at 120C.
84 A von Hirsch ‘Proportionality in the philosophy of punishment’ (1992) 16 Crime and 
Justice: A review of research 55 at 58.
85 Von Hirsch op cit (n84) 65.
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allow for offenders to be punished for future crimes, rather than the 
offence for which the offender is being sentenced.86
An exemplary sentence places the interests of society above the 
rights of the individual, premised upon the notion that offenders forfeit 
their rights when they violate the rights of others.87 There is a glaring 
absence of limits to justified punishment for both the innocent and the 
guilty.88 The offender receives a sentence of increased severity and such 
an increase is not linked to the blameworthiness of the individual. In S 
v Williams,89 Langa J criticised the imposition of exemplary sentences, 
warning ‘against the idea that the accused is to be sacrificed on the 
altar of deterrence.’90 Exemplary sentences are therefore problematic 
because of their disregard for individual human rights.
Other theoretical and empirical concerns with exemplary sentences 
have arisen from studies and observations of human nature. People are 
deterred by different prospective outcomes and at least one study has 
indicated offenders may have different psychological characteristics 
to non-offenders, precluding any accurate prediction of the deterrent 
success of exemplary sentences on the offenders.91 The theory of 
exemplary penalties is also dependent on the belief that the general 
public have a certain level of knowledge and therefore can be deterred 
by such exemplary punishments.92 In sum, there is a notable absence 
of evidence upon which a general policy of moral acceptability may 
be established.93
A more recent argument against exemplary sentences derives from 
the Constitution. Developed in a number of cases, the test for exemplary 
sentences is that the injustice to the accused must not outweigh the 
broad interests of society.94 Van Zyl Smit argues that a consequence 
of the constitutional principles of equality and proportionality could 
86 B Hudson Understanding Justice (1996) 25.
87 AH Goldman ‘Beyond the deterrence theory: comments on van den Haag’s ‘ “Punish-
ment as a device for controlling the crime rate” ’ (1980-1) 33 Rutgers Law Review 721 
at 723.
88 Ibid.
89 S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).
90 S v Williams supra (n89) at para 85.
91 Hudson op cit (n86) 21.
92 S Terblanche ‘Sentencing: affordable approaches’ in L Glanz (ed) Managing crime in 
the new South Africa (2001) 222 at 231.
93 Goldman op cit (n87) 721.
94 S v Khulu 1975 (2) SA 518 (N) at 521B-H; S v Matoma 1981 (3) SA 838 (A) at 
842H-843A; S v Collett 1990 (1) SACR 465 (A) at 470A-H; S v Maseko 1982 (1) SA 99 
(A) at 102F; S v Reay 1987 (1) SA 873 (A) at 877C; S v Sobandla 1992 (2) SACR 613 (A) 
at 617F-H; S v Potgieter 1994 (1) SACR 61 (A) in D van Zyl Smit ‘Sentencing and Pun-
ishment’ in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2004) 
49-21.
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mean that the test for exemplary sentences becomes stricter.95 The 
emphasis on proportionality in the Constitution96 as well as in the 
recent South African Law Reform Commission Report on a New Senten-
cing Framework97 indicates that retribution is a preferable sentencing 
theory. The central tenet of retribution is the constitutional principle 
of proportionality between the seriousness of the offence and the 
culpability of the offender, and the gravity of the sentence.98 There-
fore, the frequent reference to deterrence in sentencing white-collar 
criminals, whether it is a significant factor or mere lip-service, should 
be discouraged for fear of producing disproportionate, and therefore 
unconstitutional, sentences.
An emphasis on deterrence may be one of the factors that has 
led the courts to disregard more appropriate sentences than im-
prisonment in sentencing white-collar criminals. In S v Howells,99 
Van Heerden AJ considered the case of a divorced mother of three 
children who was convicted to four years’ imprisonment for fraud 
from her employer totalling R100 000 over a period of two years. An 
important aggravating factor was that the accused had already been 
convicted of fraud in 1989 and yet, surprisingly, the court felt it was 
still appropriate to emphasise the need for deterring fraud and theft 
by persons in fiduciary positions.100 Evidently, the earlier conviction 
appeared not to have had a deterrent effect on the aforementioned 
offender.
While deterring crime is a valid and necessary function of criminal 
sentences, the court in Howells should rather have focused on the 
proportionality of the sentence for the offence. The judgment is un-
satisfactory not simply because of the reference to deterrence but also 
regarding an almost impetuous response in the choice of sentence 
being imprisonment. The factors weighed by the court in a case of 
white-collar crime need not lead to an automatic decision of imprison-
ment, even taking into account the prevalence of white-collar crime 
and the need to address it.
95 Ibid.
96 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
97 South African Law Reform Commission Report (Project 82) Sentencing (A New Sen-
tencing Framework) (2000) at para 3.1.4.
98 A von Hirsch ‘Proportionate sentences: a desert perspective’ in A Ashworth and A 
von Hirsch (eds) Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (1998) 168 at 
172.
99 S v Howells supra (n79).
100 S v Howells supra (n79) at 681D.
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PART IV: INCREASED USE OF COMMUNITY SENTENCES 
FOR WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS
The South African cases discussed in Part III illustrated that imprison-
ment is the sentence of choice when it comes to white-collar criminals. 
Part IV will show the need for change. There are other punishment 
options available for white-collar criminals besides imprisonment. Until 
recently, non-custodial options, particularly community penalties, have 
been largely under-utilised by South African courts, but the increasing 
awareness of overcrowding in prisons and the growing emphasis on 
restorative justice appear to be drawing attention to the development 
and utilisation of community penalties.
Community penalties are defined as ‘non-custodial options that re-
strict the offender’s liberty in some way’101 and therefore cover a wide 
range of punishment. The restorative element of community penalties 
and the absence of violence in white collar crimes make community 
sentences appropriate punishments for certain white-collar crimes. 
However, there are obstacles to the effective and more frequent use 
of community penalties, starting with the perception that community 
penalties are ‘soft’ punishment, the theoretical framework for commu-
nity penalties and their practical implementation.
The case against imprisonment
The recent cases in the United States of America indicate an increasing 
prevalence and indeed prosecution of large-scale white-collar crime. A 
similar increased interest in prosecuting white-collar crimes occurred 
after the resolution of the Watergate scandal in the early 1980s.102 
At present, it appears that the initial cases of Enron have resulted in 
the furious and harsh sentencing of those responsible for subsequent 
white-collar crimes in the cases of John and Timothy Rigas of Adelphia 
Communications and Bernard Ebbers of Worldcom, amongst others.103 
A simple comparison of their sentences and the dollar loss involved 
 indicates not only the seriousness of their crime, but also the severity of 
101 S Rex Reforming Community Penalties (2005) at 1.
102 J Gustafson ‘Cracking down on white-collar crime: An analysis of the recent trend of 
severe sentences for corporate officers’ (2005-6) 40 Suffolk University Law Review 685 
at 690.
103 Gustafson op cit (n102) 694.
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their sentences.104 Severe sentences are appropriate for serious cases of 
white-collar crime, provided that the sentences remain proportionate.
However, imprisonment is not the sole option for white-collar crimi-
nal offenders and should not be the default option for courts sentenc-
ing them. An instinctive resort to imprisonment should be vehemently 
opposed in spite of the minimum sentencing legislation prescribing the 
imposition of lengthy sentences of imprisonment for cases of white-
collar crime.105
The use of imprisonment is a serious infringement of constitutional 
rights, with the purpose being deprivation of the offender’s liberty.106 
Combined with the constitutional considerations around custodial 
sanctions, there are empirical and pragmatic problems. The primary 
empirical criticism is that the punishment of imprisonment has not 
been proven to have a significant deterrent impact on the level of 
white-collar crime in spite of the courts’ frequent reference to its deter-
rent value.107 Neither has imprisonment had much, if any, rehabilitative 
or restorative effect.108
The pragmatic concerns are numerous and include the costs of im-
prisonment, safety of offenders and integration of offenders back into 
society.109 In the United States of America, Kahan records that impris-
onment remains the most costly form of punishment.110 The situation 
in South Africa paints a similar picture of immense expense associated 
with sentences of imprisonment. For the R11,3 billion budget of the 
Department of Correctional Services in 2007/8, the functioning of the 
237 prisons in South Africa, continues to be a large expense.111
The Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons hints at 
another practical issue related to the cost of imprisonment — over-
crowding. According to this report, the national average occupation 
104 John Rigas received a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment at 80 years of age and his 
son, Timothy, 20 years’ imprisonment for concealing debt of 2.3 million dollars. US v 
Rigas CA2 (NY), 2007. Ebbers received 25 years imprisonment for accounting fraud 
resulting in a loss of billions of dollars. Gustafson op cit (n102) 695.
105 For example, s 51(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 requires 
the High Court to impose a sentence of not less than 15 years for a first-time offender 
who commits a crime in Part II of Schedule 2, such as fraud, without deviation except 
in substantial and compelling circumstances.
106 Van Zyl Smit op cit (n94) 46-9.
107 See S v Blank supra (n29), S v Howells supra (n79) and S v Gardener supra (n46) 
above.
108 Szockyj op cit (n27) 501.
109 Szockyj op cit (n27) 502.
110 Kahan refers to the cost to the state of each prisoner in 1996 in most states being $20 
000, using the statistics of the Criminal Justice Institute in ‘Alternatives to Incarcera-
tion’ (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 1863 at 1893.
111 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons Annual Report 2006/7: Prisoners and Prisons (2007) 
10.
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level of South African prisons is 140,2% of the capacity for which the 
respective prisons was intended.112 Recently, the South African courts 
too have joined in their criticism of the deplorable levels of overcrowd-
ing.113 Thus, alternatives to imprisonment in the form of non-custodial 
sanctions must be correctly formulated and used in order to effectively 
reduce the issue of over-crowding.
White-collar crime and community sentences
There is sound theoretical and pragmatic reasoning to pursue non-
custodial sanctions in the cases of white-collar crime. There are several 
forms of non-custodial sanctions of which the most common types 
are fines and community penalties.114 Under the banner of community 
sentences can be found a great variety of sentences with the ‘connect-
ing thread’ between imprisonment and the community sentences being 
the ‘restriction of liberty.’115 For example, a sentence for a minor case of 
white-collar crime may be to restrict the offender in his or her freedom 
of movement, allowing the offender to travel only between a place of 
employment and habitation for a number of years.
Defence counsel have often argued for a community sentence, 
citing its appropriateness for white-collar criminals. The counsel for 
the accused in S v Blank claimed such a sentence holds two specific 
advantages for both society and the individual: its appropriateness for 
crimes of a non-violent nature and its rehabilitative orientation.116
First, as mentioned in Part I, incidents of white-collar crime do not 
normally involve violence.117 Offenders are therefore classified as 
non-violent and should be considered very readily by the courts for 
sentences of community penalties on this basis. From a theoretical 
perspective, Duff argues that by allowing offenders to remain in the 
community, community sanctions are able to communicate censure of 
the offender’s behaviour to the public, but also remind the offender 
of their abuse of the trust underpinning society and harmful criminal 
112 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons op cit (n111) 11.
113 Sachs J in S v M (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at 
para 51. Kahan op cit (n110) recognised the pressing issue of over-populated prisons 
in the United States of America and also advocated use of alternative penalties as part 
of the solution at 1898.
114 See D Botha ‘Increased fines for insider trading: A realistic deterrent?’ (1990) 107 
South African Law Journal 504 for a short discussion of the effectiveness of fines in 
the context of insider trading in South Africa. 
115 S Rex ‘Applying desert principles to community sentences: Lessons from two Criminal 
Justice Acts’ (1998) Criminal Law Review 381 at 382.
116 S v Blank supra (n29) at 78H.
117 See Part II.
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conduct.118 As the court noted in S v Blank, white-collar crime often 
appears to be tolerated in certain occupational and social contexts, 
therefore the communicative function of community penalties could 
challenge the attitudes of the individuals in these contexts.119
Second, as skilled workers, white-collar criminals are positioned to 
make a positive contribution to society and be rehabilitated into society. 
As mentioned previously, the case of S v Howells120 involved a fraud 
offender sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. The accused appealed 
against the High Court decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal, but in 
a short, unreported judgment, Streicher JA found the sentence imposed 
by the court a quo appropriate.121 He emphasised that although the 
accused had ‘obvious potential to be a good employee’,122 she had 
failed to gain insight from the receipt of the fine for fraud in 1989. 
These circumstances may have presented an ideal opportunity for the 
court to order a community penalty, as opposed to instinctively impos-
ing imprisonment. This would have allowed for the punishment to play 
a rehabilitative role for the recidivist offender.
It would appear as if the dismissal of the community supervision 
in Howells123 was perhaps due to a misunderstanding of the punitive 
nature of community penalties. It may also have been partly due to 
an aversion towards the present formulation of the sentence of com-
munity supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.124 The overriding concern may have been whether the Department 
for Correctional Services is equipped with adequate resources for the 
effective implementation of community penalties. Regardless of the 
underlying reasons, community sentences, while still requiring further 
attention and perhaps, more detailed thought in South African policy 
and legislation, should be used more frequently.
Fortunately, where the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to take up 
the challenge in Howells v S,125 the Constitutional Court has given fresh 
impetus to community sentences in the context of white-collar crime 
in the recent case of S v M.126 In this matter, Sachs J was called upon 
to consider the case of a recidivist offender convicted of credit card 
fraud to a sentence of four years’ direct imprisonment. He found that 
a sentence of correctional supervision was more appropriate in the 
118 Rex op cit (n101) 21.
119 S v Blank supra (n29) at 72I.
120 S v Howells supra (n79).
121 Howells v S [2000] JOL 6577 (A).
122 Howells v S supra (n121) at para 6.
123 Howells v S supra (n121).
124 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
125 Howells v S supra (n121).
126 S v M supra (n113).
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circumstances. Taking into account the three months of imprisonment 
the accused had already served awaiting trial, he converted the rest 
of the sentence into a community sentence. Of particular relevance 
is the emphasis placed on the ‘multifaceted approach to sentencing’ 
offered by correctional supervision because it comprises ‘elements of 
rehabilitation, reparation and restorative justice’.127 Sachs J also drew 
attention to the flexibility and adaptability of correctional supervision, 
which does not prescribe a specific sentence but ‘is a collective term 
for a wide range of measures…executed within the community’.128
This support for community supervision is but the beginning of a 
process to make community penalties more prominent in the sentenc-
ing of white-collar criminals in South Africa. Its impact will be felt too 
in other types of crime as the judgment provides the necessary encour-
agement for lower courts to use community sentences in more areas 
than white-collar crime. However, the Constitutional Court stopped 
short of suggesting changes to be made to the current under-utilised 
community sentences, but rather focused on promoting their use. This 
leads one to consider the manner in which community penalties are to 
achieve prominence in cases of white-collar crime.
In this respect, there are two key challenges facing the South African 
criminal justice system in attempting to use community sentences, 
which in turn prevent the utilisation of community sentences in cases 
of white-collar crime. These challenges concern firstly, the perception 
of community penalties as ‘soft’ punishment and, secondly, the neces-
sary theoretical understanding and practical implementation of com-
munity penalties.
Community penalties — a ‘soft punishment’
The first challenge with regard to community penalties is the altering 
of the public and judicial conception that they are not punishment or 
effective sanctions and the reluctance of the court to use them.129 In 
the circumstances of S v Blank, Grosskopf JA refused to issue a com-
munity sentence because even a ‘semi-custodial’ sentence would have 
been ‘totally inadequate’130 to indicate the seriousness of the crime. 
This case reflects the perception of the courts of community penalties 
as promoting leniency and providing a ‘soft’ punishment. Even critics 
of imprisonment, who realise the rehabilitative potential of community 
supervision, argue that community penalties should only be considered 
127 S v M supra (n113) at para 59.
128 S v M supra (n113) at para 60.
129 Rex op cit (n115) at 382.
130 S v Blank supra (n29) at 78G.
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alongside a short period of imprisonment for white-collar criminals to 
ensure sufficient deterrent effect.131
Community penalties, even without any additional custodial period 
in a sentence, can provide an effective and proportional punishment 
for white-collar crime. Rex points out that community penalties do not 
place the same restrictions on the liberty of an offender as imprison-
ment but, if they did, they would simply be ‘another form of custodial 
sentence’.132 Expressing the sentiments of Sachs J in S v M, community 
supervision is not a lenient sentence in comparison to imprisonment 
because, depending on the circumstances, it can be very restrictive and 
therefore punitive.133
The restrictive nature of community penalties, and the manner in 
which to consider their severity, becomes apparent when emphasis 
is placed on the correct theoretical approach. Von Hirsch suggests 
viewing the onerous nature of sentences as ‘the degree to which 
those sanctions interfere with people’s interests’ and then ranking the 
penalties ‘according to how they typically impinge on persons’ “living 
standard”’.134 The living standard is not personalised to investigate 
injury to a particular individual but relates to the ‘standardized means 
or capabilities for a good life’,135 and comprises both economic and 
non-economic interests. This flexible manner of viewing community 
sentences supports their effectiveness as a punishment and also offers 
the courts a conceptual tool with which to re-consider community 
sentences and gauge their severity.
Implementing community sentences
The second challenge is the broader theoretical framework for, and the 
practical implementation of, community penalties. There is a need for 
a relatively simple way for the court to mete out and implement such 
sentences. There will be cases of severe white-collar crime, warranting 
sentences of imprisonment; the difficulty surrounds the determination 
of the appropriate circumstances for the imposition of a community 
sentence and the form which it should take.
Von Hirsch, Wasik and fellow retributivists have attempted to show 
how non-custodial sentences can be accommodated within a sentenc-
131 See M Benson ‘White-collar offenders under community supervision’ (1985) 2 Justice 
Quarterly 429 at 437.
132 Rex op cit (n115) quoting the Home Office White Paper ‘Crime, Justice and Protecting 
the Public’, Cmnd 965 (1990, HMSO) para 4.1 at 381.
133 S v M supra (n113) at para 62.
134 A von Hirsch ‘Seriousness, severity and the living standard’ in Von Hirsch and Ash-
worth op cit (n98) 185 at 189.
135 Von Hirsch op cit (n134) 190.
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ing framework based on desert principles, positing them as sentences 
of intermediate severity.136 According to the principle of proportional-
ity, central to South African sentencing and the desert rationale, the 
severity of penalties must be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
crime and the culpability of the offender.137 In order to have a scale of 
increasing severity of punishment, one must recognise the severity of 
full custody — it is the most severe punishment to be administered by 
the South African criminal justice system.
Retribution demands that serious crimes are to be punished with 
the most severe sentence, therefore offenders who commit serious 
white-collar crimes must receive a severe but proportional sentence 
of imprisonment.138 The unconstitutionality of an exemplary sentence 
should be avoided using the principle of proportionality. Yet, for less 
serious cases of white-collar crime, the temptation to impose incarcera-
tion should be resisted and community sentences should be used.
However, the use of the scale of severity provided by retributive theory 
does not provide guidance as to when the courts should contemplate 
issuing a community sentence and the form which the sentence should 
take. In consideration of these questions, the experience of the United 
Kingdom may prove instructive for the South African criminal justice 
system. There has been notable support for community sanctions as 
punishments of intermediate severity in a desert-based framework 
in various Criminal Justice Acts of the United Kingdom. The Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 attempted to implement a hybrid framework inspired 
by the model of Wasik and Von Hirsch, favouring crime prevention 
alongside the desert model.139 The Act had little success and in fact, 
dented the popularity of, and confidence in, community sentences.
The origin of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act was a realisation that 
simply telling courts to impose community sentences more frequently 
because they are cheaper than imprisonment was not sufficient to 
address the bias against them.140 The Act served to introduce a prolif-
eration of community sentences, which were options from which the 
judicial officer selected the sentence ‘most suited for the offender and 
imposed restrictions on liberty commensurate with the seriousness of 
the offence’.141 Some of the difficulties lay in the lack of definition for 
136 See the present report from the South African Law Reform Commission op cit (n97) 
for an indication of the direction in which South African sentencing policy should be 
going — it emphasises retribution as a central aim of sentencing.
137 Von Hirsch op cit (n134)185.
138 M Wasik and A von Hirsch ‘Non-custodial penalties and the principle of proportional-
ity’ in von Hirsch and Ashworth op cit (n98) 279.
139 Rex op cit (n101) 57.
140 Rex op cit (n115) 382.
141 Rex op cit (n115) 383.
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the concept of seriousness and the determination courts were forced 
to make as to when to prioritise proportionality when sentencing and 
when to emphasise suitability of the sentence to the offender.142 Rex 
argues that the proportionality requirement should have been made 
the primary restriction on the community order, with other criteria 
such as imposing a suitable order of secondary importance.143
The 2003 Criminal Justice Act has taken a slightly different form, 
focusing on a single generic community sentence, although the es-
sential principles remain the same — much to the disappointment of 
advocates of community penalties.144 However, community sentences 
can still be revitalised as, in the opinion of some, the 1991 Act was ‘not 
really given an opportunity to work’145 and the fundamental ideas of 
von Hirsch and Wasik linger in the 2003 Act. Hence the most recent 
legislation in the 2003 Act will be given an opportunity to challenge 
the present perceptions of community sentences. The attempt to incor-
porate theory and practice regarding community sentences indicates 
that this family of sentences has the potential to be fashioned into a 
workable sentence of punishment in South Africa too.
The South African courts should not be concerned that they bear 
the sole burden for changing the state of community sentences in this 
country, despite the clear need for a change in the perceptions of 
community sentences. Rather, there are a number of other parties on 
whom the responsibility rests. A lack of training and resources may be 
responsible for the infrequent use of the community penalties in South 
Africa. While community penalties may not elicit the costs equivalent 
to the financial burden of imprisonment, they do require support in 
the form of skilled manpower and the necessary systems to monitor 
offenders.
To promote this form of punishment and gleaning from the experi-
ence of the United Kingdom, accessible legislation covering commu-
nity sentences in a more practical and effective manner would be a 
useful, and necessary, improvement. Such legislation could allow for 
two facets that are key to the sentencing of white-collar criminals: 
proportionality and flexibility. While proportionality is necessary for all 
sentences in our criminal justice system, flexibility has much to offer 
courts sentencing white-collar offenders. Section 276 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act combined with the various relevant regulations does 
not provide the variety that should be found in legislation concerning 
142 Rex op cit (n101) 58.
143 Rex op cit (n115) 384.
144 Rex op cit (n101) 57.
145 Rex op cit (n101) 59.
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non-custodial sanctions, such as placing geographical or occupational 
restrictions on offenders, or even salary restrictions.
The worn-out sentencing principle that ‘the sentence should fit the 
crime’ has not had its desired impact in the area of community sen-
tences for white-collar criminals. A community sentence could be uti-
lised to cater for white-collar offenders as a more effective punishment 
than imprisonment and this potential must be uncovered by further 
resources pledged towards and research into, not only the community 
sentence, but also white-collar crime in South Africa.
CONCLUSION
The South African criminal justice system has reason to be concerned 
at the pervasiveness of white-collar criminal activity. Illegal conduct 
is often accepted as business ‘culture’,146 as highlighted in the case 
of Blank and the line between legal and illegal behaviour in the oc-
cupational setting often appears blurred. The ambiguity surrounding 
the definition of white-collar crime is problematic in terms of providing 
a theoretical framework and especially in the assessment of its causes 
and regulation. This paper specifically dealt with cases of fraud and 
theft, although white-collar crime is reputed to involve a wide range 
of offences beyond these. However, a settled definition such as that 
of Croall placing white-collar crime in the context of the workplace 
is required by sentencing courts and policy-makers in South Africa in 
order to identify and deal with it
The ambiguities surrounding white-collar crime do have a significant 
impact in the area of sentencing. The courts in South Africa have used 
a number of factors to decide what sentence to impose on white-collar 
criminals, and these factors appear to be similar to those identified by 
Stanton Wheeler and his colleagues in a study of courts in the United 
States of America. The main points of focus are the nature of the act 
and the variables related to the actor, as expressed in the paradox of 
leniency and severity.
An additional element present in the South African cases is a re-
peated emphasis on the need for deterrence and crime prevention to 
curb the incidence of white-collar crime. The courts have responded 
by imposing imprisonment with a heavy hand, disregarding the use 
of intermediate sanctions such as community penalties. Imprisonment 
appears to lack deterrent, rehabilitative and, at times, even retributive 
potential. The criminal justice system also faces the present dilemma 
of over-crowding in prisons therefore imprisonment is an expensive 
146 S v Blank supra (n29) at 72I.
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and undesirable sentence option. In S v M,147 the Constitutional Court 
acknowledged the importance of other non-custodial options and this 
should provide the impetus for courts and policy-makers to consider 
the community sentence in a new light.
Contrary to popular and even judicial perceptions, community pen-
alties offer a punitive and effective sanction. They blend elements of 
rehabilitation, restorative justice and retribution, helping the offender 
to reintegrate into the community. In particular, white-collar offenders 
are often economically viable and productive members of community 
who have not been convicted of a violent crime and are therefore easily 
re-integrated into society. Community penalties are suitable sentences 
for white-collar criminals because of these restorative aims.
Moreover, community penalties have the potential to be exceedingly 
restrictive, depending upon their content, and deprive offenders of the 
right to freedom of choice and movement in various justifiable ways. 
The perception of community penalties as ‘soft’ punishment stems 
from the issue of measuring the severity of these sentences. However, 
as von Hirsch has suggested, severity can be measured according to 
the degree to which the orders interfere with and restrict the freedom 
of the offender.
In addition, guidance for the theoretical framework and practical 
implementation of community sentences can be found in the ideas of 
Wasik and von Hirsch who emphasise the non-custodial sentence as a 
penalty of intermediate severity. The Criminal Justice Acts of 1991 and 
2003 of the United Kingdom follow from these concepts and encour-
age the use of community sentences in a retributive system. These Acts 
suggest that a greater emphasis needs to be placed on community sen-
tences in South Africa, both in terms of resources and research. Further 
research into community sentences to obtain the flexibility expressed 
in the Criminal Justice Acts148 should ensure such sentences are viable 
and effective options for white-collar offenders, promoting a multi-
dimensional approach to their sentencing. It is for the courts, legisla-
tors and policy-makers to take up the challenge of the Constitutional 
Court to utilise community sanctions more frequently. The increasing 
prevalence of white-collar crime and the state of overcrowding in South 
African prisons place a sense of urgency on the need to place greater 
resources into administering and investigating non-custodial sanctions 
in the context of sentencing white-collar criminals.
147 S v M supra (n113).
148 Criminal Justice Act of 1991; Criminal Justice Act of 2003.
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